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BOOK REVIEW
CONCEPTUAL LIMITATIONS ON
LONG-ARM JURISDICTION
DanielJ. Capra*
Jurisdiction in Civil Actions: Territorial Basis and Process Limitations
on Jurisdiction of State and Federal Courts. Robert C. Casad. Boston:
Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc. 1983. Pp. xxi, 793. $65.00.
Professor Casad's book is the first comprehensive treatment of the
problems that can arise in obtaining personal jurisdiction over a defendant in the forum of a plaintiff's choice. Based on his painstaking
and exhaustive survey of over 3,900 state and federal long-arm cases,
Professor Casad attempts to predict the probable results of such cases
in a wide variety of factual situations. Casad also analyzes, among
other things, constitutional limitations on state court jurisdiction,
problems of personal jurisdiction in federal courts, service of process,
and methods of challenging personal jurisdiction.
A book this comprehensive is not adequately reviewed by a seriatim
discussion of the various subjects it covers. Each chapter provides a
wealth of information and exposition on the difficult issues that often
arise in efforts to obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant. Casad's book undoubtedly will be useful for practitioners
and students in every state for solving any jurisdictional problem that
may arise. In the detailed chapters on long-arm jurisdiction, for example, Professor Casad provides not only probable results in general, but
also copious footnotes delineating the results reached by every court
on the facts discussed in text.
Beyond its use as an instructional and research tool, the book promotes serious thought on the formalistic nature of the law governing
forum allocation in the United States. This formalism-under which
any rational and comprehensive treatment must suffer-is largely
caused by two conceptual demons that should have been discarded
long ago: (1) respect for the supposed sovereignty interests of the state
of a non-resident defendant, and the corresponding limitations on the
forum state; and (2) reliance on physical contacts and physical presence of a defendant within the forum. Professor Casad emphasizes
that conceptual concerns with sovereignty limitations or with physical
presence serve no useful purpose in a modern, efficient system of
forum allocation. Nonetheless, throughout the book the catalogued
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University. A.B. Rockhurst College,
1974; J.D. University of California, Berkeley, 1977.
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results illustrate the continuing importance of these principles imported into our jurisdictional thought so long ago in Pennoyer v.
Neff.' Because of these limiting principles, the courts, led by the
Supreme Court, have failed to focus on the practical, real-life factors
that should control any assertion of personal jurisdiction: the convenience of the litigants, and the interest, if any, of the forum state in
hearing the litigation. This failure has led to decisions that have little
2
to do with modern commercial reality or fairness among litigants.
The continuing influence of presence and sovereignty limitations
has led to uncertainty, impracticality, and unfairness. This book, on
balance, indicates that the courts have not arrived at any principled
particularization of results except in the clearest cases. The fact that a
lack of predictability exists after 3,900 cases does not tarnish Professor
Casad's effort, which brings as much order as possible to a chaotic
situation. Responsibility for the unpredictable state of affairs rests
with the Supreme Court, which still relies on ancient formalisms that
confuse the lower courts and prevent them from reaching reasonable
results.
Of course, even if the Supreme Court could give clear constitutional
guidelines for determining the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction, there would still be unpredictability of result in a fifty-state
system with different statutory bases of jurisdiction. As pointed out by
Professor Casad, 3 states have construed similar long-arm provisions in
contrary fashions. 4 Moreover, some long-arm statutes cover a broader
range of in-state contacts than others. 5
While fully uniform results are unlikely, more consistency is possible with clear constitutional guidance from the Supreme Court. Guidance for its own sake, however, will not promote consistency. The
principles effectuated must be based upon the convenience of both
parties, not just the defendant, and the interests of the forum state,
not the sovereignty of the defendant's state. As long as Supreme Court

1. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2. See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
3. R. Casad, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions, 4.01[1][b], at 4-5 to -6 (1983).
4. Compare Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432, 438, 444, 176 N.E.2d 761, 764, 767 (1961) (statute providing jurisdiction over
tortious act committed in the state applies to out-of-state act with in-state effect)
with Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc. (Feathers v. McLucas), 15 N.Y.2d 443, 463, 209 N.E.2d 68, 79, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 23 (similar statutory
language; contrary result reached because Illinois court's interpretation in Gray
"exceeds the bounds of sound statutory construction"), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905

(1965).
5. Compare Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (West 1973) (jurisdiction co-extensive with constitutional principles) with N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 302 (McKinney 1972
& Supp. 1983-84) (enumerated-acts long-arm not as extensive as constitution allows).
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"guidance" is grounded in Pennoyer-type formalistic theory, even if it
is unambiguous, lower courts will remain either confused or rebellious. 6
This Book Review presents some thoughts on the Supreme Court's
treatment of personal jurisdiction as a formalistic legal principle, and
the fallout of such inhibited treatment on the lower courts. Consideration is also given to the Court's most recent flirtations with the
concepts of sovereignty and physical presence in Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc. 7 and Calder v. Jones.8 With the inspiration of Professor Casad's thorough and thoughtful work, an attempt should be
made to clarify this muddled area of the law.
I.

THE CONTINUING PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY LIMITATIONS

A. King Pennoyer III
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,9 the Supreme
Court stated that the due process clause protects two separate and
independent interests in any exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant. First, the defendant has a personal right to be
free from the burdens of distant litigation unless he has "minimum
contacts" with the forum.' 0 Second, even if the defendant suffers no
burdens of distant litigation, the independent sovereignty interests of
the defendant's state nonetheless must be satisfied through a finding of
minimum contacts." The sovereignty interest articulated in WorldWide is not the interest of the defendant's state in protecting the
defendant. An unburdened defendant has no need of protection, and
a burdened defendant is protected by the minimum contacts test
regardless of the defendant's state's interest. Rather, the relevant interest of the defendant's state is "the sovereign power to try causes"
involving its residents that are instead tried in a state chosen by the

6. Recent cases showing confusion, rebellion, or both, include: Armstrong v.
Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, 176-77 (Del. 1980) (upholding jurisdiction on contacts
held insufficient in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)); Humphrey v. Langford,
246 Ga. 732, 733-34, 273 S.E.2d 22, 23-24 (1980) (transient jurisdiction upheld
despite lack of minimum contacts); West Am. Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 337 N.W.2d
676, 681 (Minn. 1983) (Wisconsin tavern not subject to Minnesota long-arm and
dram shop acts under World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980)). The difficulty of Professor Casad's undertaking is illustrated by Westin.
Based on the cases he surveyed, he had predicted that jurisdiction would be asserted
in a case like Westin. R. Casad, supra note 3, 7.02[2][b][ii], at 7-11 (1983)).
7. 52 U.S.L.W. 4346 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984).
8. 52 U.S.L.W. 4349 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984).
9. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
10. Id. at 291-92 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945)).
11. Id. at 294.
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plaintiff. 12 Under World-Wide, if minimum contacts are not established, the forum state, in effect, is violating the "due process rights"
of the defendant's state when it hears the plaintiff's case-even if the
defendant himself suffers no burden in defending in the forum state.
In the absence of minimum contacts, the forum state is acting beyond
its sovereign power and encroaching on the sovereign powers of a
sister state.
The Robinsons, plaintiffs in World-Wide, understandably could be
surprised that they would have to sue both a tri-state distributor and a
local seller of automobiles in the distant state of sale (New York), as
opposed to the place of damage (Oklahoma). Neither objecting defendant in World-Wide pointed to any extra burden it would incur by
defending in Oklahoma. In fact, the Court in World-Wide recognized
that in the modern world of instant communication and transportation-not to speak of insurance-the cases in which a defendant3
would be burdened by distant litigation would be relatively rare.1
Furthermore, in World-Wide it could be legitimately argued that
because the evidence and witnesses were in Oklahoma, a suit in that
state would be more convenient for defendants than a suit in New
York.14 Therefore, anyone trying to explain to the Robinsons why they
12. Id. at 293.
13. The Court cited language from the expansive opinion in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957): "With... increasing nationalization
of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted ...
across state lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have
made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he
engages in economic activity." 444 U.S. at 293. The court in World-Wide concluded:
"The historical developments noted in McGee, of course, have only accelerated in the
generation since that case was decided." Id.
It has been argued that because the due process clause even protects against
minimal deprivations, a non-resident defendant will almost always suffer a protectible deprivation (burden) in being sued away from "home." See Brilmayer, How
Contacts Count: Due Process Limitationson State Court Jurisdiction,1980 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 77, 85 n.48 (citing as an example Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
(temporary deprivation of possessory interest in household goods implicates due
process clause)). Many defendants today, however, will have difficulty showing
burdens of distant litigation sufficient to meet even the de minimis standards suggested. Insurance coverage and cost spreading both shift the burden of litigation
away from many defendants. Further, cases will arise in which litigation will require
the defendant's presence in the state at any rate. See Jones v. Calder, 138 Cal. App.
3d 128, 137, 187 Cal. Rptr. 825, 832 (1982) (individual defendants would be present
in forum as witnesses in litigation to which corporate defendant is subject; jurisdiction permissible because individuals not burdened), aff'd on other grounds, 52
U.S.L.W. 4349 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984). Finally, if we are truly concerned with
protecting defendants from the burdens of distant litigation, a sovereignty-oriented
theory based on haphazard state lines is ill-designed for the purpose. See Buckley v.
New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 184 (2d Cir. 1967).
14. See 444 U.S. at 294.
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had to hobble to New York to sue two corporations would have to say
sheepishly: "It's because of a concept; it has nothing to do with you or
the defendants. It has nothing to do with where your case can be tried
most conveniently. It's because of an idea we call 'sovereignty.' You
are only pawns in the game of federalism."
As Professor Casad stresses, the talismanic result in World-Wide is
symptomatic of the formalistic legal reasoning, 15 particularly the reliance on fictional sovereignty interests, employed by the Supreme
Court in its 100-year bout with principles of personal jurisdiction. 16
The progenitor of these theoretical sovereignty limitations was of
course Justice Field's opinion in Pennoyer.17 The Court in Pennoyer
held, in effect, that sovereign interests of other states were protected
by the due process clause from the forum state's assertion of jurisdiction over a non-resident. According to Pennoyer, due process could
only be satisfied through actual presence of the defendant or his
property in the forum.
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington 8 expanded the possibility of
compliance with the due process clause beyond the limitations of
presence to include situations in which the defendant has minimum
contacts with the forum. 19 The Court in InternationalShoe, however,
did not upset Pennoyer's morganatic marriage of due process and
sovereignty limitations. It merely added the personal interest of the
defendant in avoiding the burdens of distant litigation to the due
process formula. The due process clause continued to protect abstract
notions of territorial sovereignty. Any doubt on this point was erased
by Hanson v. Denckla,2 0 in which the Court expressly relied on the
continued validity of sovereignty and territoriality limitations embodied in the due process clause. This reliance on the shibboleth of
''
sovereignty earned Hanson the mantle of "King Pennoyer II. 21

15. See C. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 38-39
(1960).
16. See R. Casad, supra note 35, 2.01-.04.
17. For a penetrating criticism of Justice Field's ill-considered application of
international sovereignty principles to a union of federal states, see Hazard, A
General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 S. Ct. Rev. 241, 252-72.
18. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
19. As Professor Ehrenzweig noted, the "extreme flexibility" of the minimum
contacts test is on its face "hardly preferable to the extreme rigidity" of the power and
presence doctrine that International Shoe supposedly replaced. Ehrenzweig, The
Transient Rule of PersonalJurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens,
65 Yale L.J. 289, 312 (1956).
20. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
21. See Ehrenzweig, From State Jurisdictionto Interstate Venue, 50 Or. L. Rev.
103, 104 (1971) (Hanson described as "King ... Pennoyer II with all the sins and
sorrows of his late ancestor").
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In Shaffer v. Heitner,22 the Court appeared to open a new jurisdictional era in which due process limitations would be relevant only
insofar as necessary to protect against the burdens of distant litigation.
The Court promisingly stated: "[T]he relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive
sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest, became
23
the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, the apparent attempt in Shaffer to eradicate sovereignty interests from due process analysis was doomed to failure by the
Court's test for determining when due process would be satisfied. In
defining the throwaway terms from International Shoe-"fairness"
and "minimum contacts"-the Court in Shaffer opted for the defendant's contacts approach, 4 rather than the balance of interests approach.2 5 Both approaches can lay claim to being the proper interpretation of International Shoe's due process/fairness doctrine. 26 Under
the defendant's contacts approach, due process is satisfied only when
the defendant has purposefully created and controlled sufficient contacts with the forum state.2 7 In contrast, the more expansive balance
of interests approach to fairness allows a court to consider several
pragmatic factors relevant to the due process inquiry, including: the
actual inconvenience that the defendant would suffer by defending in
the forum; the legitimate interest of the forum in hearing the case;
whether the case could be conveniently tried in the forum; and
whether the plaintiff would be inconvenienced by suing elsewhere. 2
The defendant's contacts approach requires a hypertechnical analysis to determine whether in-state activity can be attributed to, or
"counted" against, the defendant. 29 In Shaffer, for example, the Court
held that ownership of stock and acceptance of a directorship in a

22. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
23. Id. at 204. In reaching this retrospective interpretation, the Court in Shaffer
was faced with its previous reliance on sovereignty principles in Hanson. The Court
explained Hanson as "simply" making the point "that the States are defined by their
geographical territory." 433 U.S. at 204 n.20. This explanation is notably unconvincing; the majority in Hanson surely was doing more than giving its readers a lesson in
elementary geography.
24. See Nordenberg, State Courts, Personal Jurisdiction and the Evolutionary
Process, 54 Notre Dame Law. 587, 618-30 (1979).
25. See R. Casad, supra note 3, 2.02[4][b], at 2-22.
26. See Nordenberg, supra note 24, at 593-96.
27. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
28. The balancing approach was adopted in McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957). It is remarkably similar to the "forum conveniens"
approach advocated by Professor Ehrenzweig. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 19, at
312-14.
29. See Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 80, 112.

1040

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

Delaware corporation were not countable contacts with Delaware. 30
Similarly, the Court in World-Wide held that the presence of an
automobile in Oklahoma was not countable against the seller or distributor, although presence of the automobile in the state of sale
would have been countable. 31 Courts before World-Wide understandably had failed to make this distinction when "counting" contacts. 32
Shaffer's unfortunate perpetuation of the defendant's contacts approach to minimum contacts left the door open for re-entry of abstract
sovereignty limitations into due process analysis. It is possible that in
many cases a defendant without "purposeful" or "countable" contacts
with the forum will nonetheless suffer no meaningful inconvenience
when sued in that forum. 33 If the defendant suffers no burden from
distant litigation, he has suffered no deprivations that are protected
by the due process clause. In such a situation, the lack of defendant's
contacts should not prohibit assertion of jurisdiction unless the defendant's contacts test protects other interests besides those personal to the
defendant. If defendant's contacts are required as a sine qua non, as
the Court in Shaffer appeared to hold, a court ultimately must search
for other interests besides the defendant's to support the existence of
the test. The conceptual sovereignty interest of the defendant's state in
trying the case in its courts is the only available candidate for such
support.
The Court in Shaffer was able under the facts to avoid the sovereignty dilemma inherent in the defendant's contacts approach. In
Shaffer, the defendant's contacts test was used to protect individual
defendants who clearly would have been burdened by litigation in the
forum state. 34 Similarly, the Court in Kulko v. Superior Court3s did
not mention sovereignty concepts because the defendant would have
been burdened by litigation in the forum state. 3 But when the defendants in World-Wide could point to no similar burdens, continued
adherence to the defendant's contacts test forced the Court to retreat
to Pennoyer conceptualisms. The Court in World-Wide thus stifled
the ill-fated attempt in Shaffer to repudiate sovereignty limitations on
jurisdiction. The only difference between World-Wide and Pennoyer
therefore lies in the facts that must exist before sovereignty interests
are satisfied: Countable "contacts" are required instead of physical
30. 433 U.S. at 216.
31. 444 U.S. at 295-98.
32. See R. Casad, supra note 3, 7.02[2][c][iii], at 7-25 to -26.
33. An example would be the factual situation in World-Wide or, even better, a
situation in which the tri-state distributor in that case was sued not in Oklahoma but
in Pennsylvania, just across the state line from its principal place of business in New
Jersey. See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 301 & n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. See 433 U.S. at 216.
35. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
36. See id. at 91.
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"presence." This is not much of a difference, however, because physical presence is a very important factor in determining whether the
defendant's contacts test has been met. 37 World-Wide clearly has
earned the title of "King Pennoyer III."-3
As Professor Casad aptly notes, the Court's questionable reliance on
theoretical sovereignty limitations has created great uncertainty regarding the proper application of jurisdictional principles. 39 Lower
courts left to apply an outmoded theory in the modem era of interare bound to be less than
state communication and transportation
40

predictable in their outcomes.

B. The End of the Pennoyer Dynasty?
The ultimate irony of a theory that imports sovereignty limitations
into due process analysis is that it is based on a fundamentally flawed
construction of the due process clause itself. 4' The due process clause
regulates the relationship between state and citizen. It says nothing
whatsoever about relationships among the states. 42 The due process
of interstate federalism" as the
clause patently is not an "instrument
43

Court in World-Wide claimed.

37. See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
38. See R. Casad, supra note 3, 2.04[2][e], at 2-59 to -61.
39. Id. 2.05, at 2-64.
40. See Note, Bauxites' "Individual Liberty Interest" and the Right to Control
Amenability to Suit in Personal Jurisdiction Analysis, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 1278,
1287 & n.53 (1983) (post-World-Wide cases in which lower courts did not even
discuss sovereignty interests) [hereinafter cited as Amenability to Suit]. In Paolino v.
Channel Home Centers, 668 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1981), the court held that similarities
in substantive law between the forum state and defendant's state satisfied the sovereignty interests stressed in World-Wide. Id. at 724. The court in Paolino failed to
note that the sovereignty interest identified by World-Wide was the interest of
defendant's state in trying the case in its own courts. 444 U.S. at 294. Even if the
forum state applied the law of defendant's state, the sovereignty interest stressed in
World-Wide would not be satisfied.
Further inconsistency is illustrated by Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652
F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981), in which the court applied due process sovereignty
limitations to protect the sovereign interests of Taiwan, id. at 1039, even though
World-Wide referred to the due process clause as an "instrument of interstatefederalism," 444 U.S. at 294 (emphasis added).
41. See Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and PersonalJurisdiction:A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1112, 1113-14 (1981); Supreme Court, 1979 Term,
94 Harv. L. Rev. 75, 113-16 (1980).
42. Unlike the text of the full faith and credit clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1,
which specifically regulates interstate relationships, the due process clause makes no
mention of federalism concepts. For the view that the full faith and credit clause,
and not the due process clause, is the proper regulator of interstate forum allocation,
see Justice O'Connell's dissenting opinion in State ex rel. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v.
Sulmonetti, 252 Or. 121, 130-33, 448 P.2d 571, 575-77 (1968).
43. 444 U.S. at 294.
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The Court, somewhat sheepishly, apparently has recognized the
fallacy of its constitutional construction of due process begun in Pennoyer and perpetuated in World-Wide. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,44 the Court was faced squarely
with one of the anomalous legacies of Pennoyer and World-Wide:
Assuming that a defendant could waive his own objection to personal
jurisdiction 45 even in the absence of minimum contacts, how could he
waive his state's independent sovereign right to try the case in its own
courts? It would seem that under World-Wide, if the defendant's
contacts test is not satisfied, the defendant's state's sovereignty interest
prohibits 46assertion of jurisdiction regardless of anything the defendant
may say.
The Court in Bauxites nonetheless held that a forum could exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant who waived his personal right to object
to personal jurisdiction. 47 This means that there will be situations in
which a court will adjudicate a controversy notwithstanding the absence of defendant's contacts. The Court's explanation of how this
could be allowed, despite the apparent violation of the independent
sovereignty interests of defendant's state, was secreted in a footnote:
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal
jurisdiction, as applied to state courts, reflects an element of federalism and the character of state sovereignty vis-a-vis other
States ....
The restriction on state sovereign power described in
[World-Wide], however, must be seen as ultimately a function of
the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.
That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns."4

As noted by Professor Casad, 49 and by Justice Powell's concurring
opinion, 50 the implications of the Court's apparent retreat from sover44. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
45. The lower court imposed personal jurisdiction on the defendant for refusal to
comply with orders to submit to jurisdictional discovery. Id. at 699; see Fed. R. Civ.
P. 37(b)(2)(A).
46. The court in World-Wide unwittingly brought the doctrine of personal jurisdiction perilously close to the doctrine of subject matter jurisdiction. As is true with
subject matter jurisdiction, it appeared after World-Wide that litigants could not
supply the power to assert personal jurisdiction that a court did not have. Cf.
Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908) (parties may not waive lack
of subject matter jurisdiction).
47. 456 U.S. at 703.
48. Id. at 702 n. 10 (emphasis added).
49. R. Casad, supra note 3, 2.0412][e][iii], at 2-61 n.177. Bauxites was decided
as the book was being edited, so we must wait for the supplements to receive
Professor Casad's full treatment of the case. Professor Casad's preliminary observation that the Court's position on sovereignty "remains obscure," however, is quite to
the point. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
50. 456 U.S. at 710.
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eignty principles are obscure but potentially far-reaching. The Court
in Bauxites suggests that the defendant's state's sovereignty interest
under the due process clause is really the same as the defendant's
personal interest in avoiding the burdens of distant litigation. 51 If the
sovereign interest is coterminous with defendant's interest, however, it
is not a relevant interest at all: It is fully satisfied, for example, not
only when defendant fails to properly object to jurisdiction, as in
Bauxites, but also when defendant has no objection because he is not
burdened by distant litigation. Under this broad view of Bauxites, the
independent sovereign interest of defendant's state in trying the case
in its own courts has been dropped from consideration under the due
process clause because it is unrelated to the defendant's personal due
process interest.52
If the Court in Bauxites meant to jettison the defendant's state's
conceptual interest in hearing the case from jurisdictional consideration, the applicability of the defendant's contacts test will be relatively limited. A court would not even have to look for countable
contacts if the defendant was not burdened by litigating in the forum;
the lack of burden would be enough to satisfy both the defendant's
personal due process interest and the coterminous interest of defendant's state in protecting its resident.5 3 Given the omnipresence of
insurance and advances in transportation and communication, it
would not be unreasonable to predict that a defendant's contacts
analysis would be unnecessary in many cases. Long-arm statutes requiring enumerated acts by the defendant in the state would be
unnecessarily limited. Amendments to such statutes would be possible, providing for jurisdiction even in the absence of purposeful contacts if defendant would not be inconvenienced by litigation in the
forum.
On the other hand, it is rather a leap to conclude that a brave new
world of jurisdiction without formalistic sovereignty limitations was
ushered in by Bauxites. It is unlikely that the Court intended to deformalize the law of jurisdiction by way of a cryptic footnoteespecially when the formalism of sovereignty had been so recently and
forcefully stressed in World-Wide. A more limited view of Bauxites is
that it permits a defendant to waive an objection to the lack of
minimum contacts, despite the violation of the independent sovereign
right of the defendant's state to try the case in its courts. As Justice

51. Id. at 702 & n.10.
52. See generally Redish, supra note 41 (federalism concerns not proper in due
process analysis).
53. While the defendant's state under World-Wide has an independent interest
in trying the case in its own courts, such an interest would no longer be relevant to
the due process analysis under this broad interpretation of Bauxites.
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Powell notes, this view is irreconcilable with the axiom that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under which waiver of the jurisdictional objection was found in Bauxites,5 4 do not expand the jurisdictional power of federal district courts.5 5 If the Court is willing to live
with such an anomaly, the importance of the defendant's contacts test
is not diminished unless the defendant consents in some way to jurisdiction.
Under the limited view of Bauxites as a waiver exception, a defendant still may object to jurisdiction in the absence of purposeful contacts, despite the fact that he would not be inconvenienced by litigating in the forum. The defendant, loyal citizen that he is, is allowed to
raise his state's objection to the violation of its independent sovereign
interest to try the case in its own courts. Thus, the Robinsons must still
travel to New York because of a concept. As Professor Casad states, it
is hard to believe that the Court can make so much out of an outmoded concept after all this time. 56 Yet reliance on the abstract notion
of sovereignty is the clear import of World-Wide. It would be risky to
intent to
presume that the Court in Bauxites totally abandoned 5 its
7
govern state court jurisdiction by formalistic limitations.
The current role of sovereignty limitations was further obscured by
the Court's recent cryptic references to Bauxites in Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc. 5s Defendant Hustler was sued for libel in New Hampshire, in which it sold between 10,000 and 15,000 copies of its magazine each month. The plaintiff, a non-resident, sued in New Hamp-

54. In Bauxites, the lack of minimum contacts was considered waived by the
defendant's failure to comply with jurisdictional discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(A). Another waiver possibility exists under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1), which
provides for waiver of jurisdictional objections if not made in the motion to dismiss,
or in the answer if a motion to dismiss is not made.
55. 456 U.S. at 715 (Powell, J., concurring); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 82. The same
anomaly exists in state courts if state rules of procedure allow waiver of a defendant's
right to object to jurisdiction. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 430.80 (West 1973);
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 3211(e) (McKinney 1972); Ohio R. Civ. P. 12(h). This would
result in the forum state's hearing the case, absent minimum contacts, in violation of
the defendant's state's sovereign right to try the case in its own courts.
56. R. Casad, supra note 3, 2.04[2][e][ii], at 2-61.
57. Other interpretations of Bauxites have been suggested. See Note, Personal
Jurisdiction in Flux: Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 136, 161 (1983) (Court's mention of individual liberty
interest in dictum does not require a finding of purposeful contact in all cases);
Amenability to Suit, supra note 40, at 1289-90 (Bauxites replaces independent sovereignty interest with individual liberty interest; requires finding of purposeful contacts
or waiver even though defendant suffers no inconvenience from litigating in the
forum).
58. 52 U.S.L.W. 4346 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984). Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion for eight justices. Justice Brennan wrote an opinion concurring in the
judgment.
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shire to take advantage of its six-year statute of limitations. 59 The suit
was for injuries suffered not only in New Hampshire, but in every
other state. 60
The Court began its jurisdictional analysis by noting that Hustler's
purposeful circulation within New Hampshire would ordinarily satisfy the minimum contacts test. 6 1 Justice Rehnquist then addressed
three concerns that the lower court felt took the case out of the
ordinary defendant's contacts analysis: (1) the plaintiff was suing for
multi-state damages under the single publication rule; (2) the plaintiff
was exploiting an unusually 62long statute of limitations; and (3) the
plaintiff was a non-resident.
The Court quickly disposed of the statute of limitations and nonresident plaintiff concerns, holding that neither was relevant to the
jurisdictional inquiry.6 3 The fact that plaintiff was suing to collect
59. New Hampshire was the only state in which the plaintiffs cause of action
was still timely. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir.
1982), rev'd, 52 U.S.L.W. 4346 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984).
60. The plaintiff's multi-state libel action was made possible by the single publication rule, which allows all damages suffered in all jurisdictions to be recovered in a
single action. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4346, 4347-48; Restatement (Second) of Torts §
577A(4) (1977). By preventing piecemeal litigation in each state, the single publication rule is usually beneficial to defendants. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4348; Restatement
(Second) Torts § 577A comment f (1977). In Keeton, however, the operation of the
single publication rule in tandem with the six-year statute of limitations could allow
the plaintiff to collect damages suffered in forty-nine states in which she could not
even bring a timely action.
61. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4347. In stressing the continued validity of the minimum
contacts test, the court relied on International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317, and WorldWide, 444 U.S. at 297-98.
62. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4347.
63. Id. at 4347-48. The Court stated that the statute of limitations problem was
purely a choice of law question, relying on the separation of choice of law analysis
from jurisdictional analysis in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958). Justice
Rehnquist concluded that "we do not think that such choice of law concerns should
complicate or distort the jurisdictional inquiry." 52 U.S.L.W. at 4348. By keeping
the choice of law and jurisdictional inquiries separate, the Court remained faithful to
the defendant's contacts approach to minimum contacts. See supra notes 24-33 and
accompanying text. Under the more wide-ranging balance of interests approach to
minimum contacts, a state that has an interest in applying its law will generally have
a legitimate interest in exercising jurisdiction. This forum state interest is an important factor in determining whether jurisdiction is permissible under the balance of
interests approach. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 224-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
As to the non-resident plaintiff concern, the Court stated that the test for minimum contacts was whether the defendant, not the plaintiff, had sufficient controllable contacts with the forum state. Plaintiffs residency within the forum would be
relevant only insofar as it affected defendant's forum state activity. The Court stated:
"Plaintiff's residence may be the focus of the activities of the defendant out of which
the suit arises. But plaintiff's residence in the forum State is not a separate requirement, and lack of residence will not defeat jurisdiction established on the basis of
defendant's contacts." 52 U.S.L.W. at 4348 (emphasis added).
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damages for both out-of-state and in-state injury under the single
publication rule, however, was considered relevant to due process
limitations on jurisdiction. The Court stated: "[I]t is certainly relevant
to the jurisdictional inquiry that [plaintiff] is seeking to recover damages suffered in all states in this one suit.... That is, the contacts
between respondent and New Hampshire must be such that it is 'fair'
to compel respondent to defend a multistate lawsuit....
The

The Court reiterated this point in dictum in its recent decision in Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 52 U.S.L.W. 4491 (U.S. April 24, 1984). In
Hall, non-resident plaintiffs sued the defendant in Texas on a cause of action that did
not arise from the defendant's contacts with that state. The Court held that the
defendant's countable contacts did not support general jurisdiction. Id. at 4493. The
Court did not consider the plaintiff's non-residence a factor in this decision, stating
that a plaintiffs "lack of residential or other contacts with Texas of itself does not
defeat otherwise proper jurisdiction." Id. at 4492 n.5.
The Court's rejection of the relevance of the plaintiff's non-residence also reflects a
strict adherence to the defendant's contacts approach to fairness. Under the balance
of interests approach, a state's interest in adjudicating a case may be significantly less
when the plaintiff is a non-resident. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 110
(2d Cir.), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844
(1969). On the other hand, in Keeton's companion case, Calder v. Jones, 52
U.S.L.W. 4349 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984), the Court appeared to keep the door open for
plaintiff-oriented factors to substitute for a lack of defendant's contacts. In Calder,
plaintiff was a resident of the forum. The Court defined its minimum contacts test as
follows:
In judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on "the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). The plaintiffs lack of "contacts" will not defeat
otherwise proper jurisdiction, but they may be so manifold as to permit
jurisdictionwhen it would not exist in their absence. Here the plaintiff is the
focus of the activities of the defendants out of which the suit arises.
Id. at 4350-51 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). This language may indicate that
while defendant's contacts are sufficient notwithstanding the lack of plaintiff's contacts, the existence of significant plaintiff contacts in the forum can substitute for a
lack of defendant's contacts. This broad reading comports with a balance of interests
approach to minimum contacts under which defendant's contacts are not a sine qua
non if other relevant factors, such as the interest of a resident plaintiff in suing
conveniently, exist.
However, a more limited view of the loose language in Calder is possible. The
Court may have been stressing that plaintiff's residency is only relevant to the extent
that plaintiff was a target of defendant's purposeful in-state contacts. In light of the
Court's reference in Keeton to the plaintiff as the focus of defendant's in-state
contacts, this is probably what the Court intended. Keeton, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4348
(citing Calder; defendant's relationship with a resident' plaintiff may "enhance defendant's contacts with the forum"); see Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall, 52 U.S.L.W. 4491 n.51 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1984) (plaintiff's residence not an
independent factor, but in-state residence may enhance defendant's contacts). Thus,
the Court probably still rejects the plaintiff's interest in suing conveniently as an
appropriate inquiry under the minimum contacts test.
64. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4347 (emphasis added).
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question for the Court was how the ordinary finding of defendant's
contacts, with which the Court began its analysis, would be affected
by the fact that plaintiff was bringing a multi-state damage action.
With the multi-state aspect of the litigation apparently in mind, the
Court addressed the lower court's contention that New Hampshire's
interest in adjudicating an action based mainly on out-of-state injuries
was minimal. Stating that the forum state's interest in the litigation,
or lack of it, was relevant to the due process inquiry,65 the Court made
a cryptic reference to Bauxites:66 "But insofar as the state's 'interest' in
adjudicating the dispute is a part of the Fourteenth Amendment due
process equation, as a surrogatefor some of the factors already men' 67
tioned, see [Bauxites], we think the interest [herein] is sufficient."
The reference to Bauxites in Keeton is extremely curious because it
does not refer directly to the sovereignty issues with which Bauxites
was concerned. Bauxites questioned the World-Wide proposition that
the sovereignty interests of sister states in hearing a case act independently of the defendant's interests as a limitation on the forum state.
The bulk of the Court's analysis in Keeton focused on a different
factor, which is also independent of defendant's personal interestswhether the forum state is sufficiently interested in hearing the litigation. Strictly speaking, a defendant has no complaint about a forum's
interest or lack thereof if: (1) he has sufficient contacts, as the Court
admitted was the case in Keeton; (2) he is not burdened by distant
litigation; or (3) he has waived his jurisdictional objection. Yet the
Court in Keeton appeared to recognize an objection to a lack of a
forum state's interest even though the defendant had no personal
complaint about defending in the forum. This is World-Wide in
different clothing: In World-Wide, the defendants could argue a
violation of a sister state's sovereignty even when they had no personal
complaint regarding jurisdiction; in Keeton, the defendant could argue a lack of forum interest even when it had no personal complaint
68
regarding jurisdiction.
65. The Court cited World-Wide and McGee for this proposition. Id. By holding
the forum state's interest relevant, the Court once again perpetuated uncertainty as
to whether it has truly abandoned the balance of interests approach to fairness in
favor of the defendant's contacts approach. See infra note 76.
66. The First Circuit did not refer to Bauxites in its decision below. Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 52 U.S.L.W. 4346 (U.S.
Mar. 20, 1984).
67. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4347 (emphasis added). The court found New Hampshire's
interest in adjudicating the dispute sufficient on two grounds: 1) as to the in-state
damages, New Hampshire has an obvious interest in deterring tortious in-state
activity; 2) as to the out-of-state damages, New Hampshire, in cooperation with
other states, has an interest in efficient litigation of a multi-state libel in a single
action. Id. at 4347-48.
68. This World-Wide-like proposition provoked a concurrence from Justice Brennan. He contended that the majority's inquiry into the forum state's interest was

1048

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

It is unclear whether Keeton mandates a separate forum interest
inquiry in every case. The Court undertook its forum interest analysis
only because, unlike the ordinary case, the plaintiff in Keeton sought
multi-state damages. However, given the generalized way in which
the Court ultimately discussed the forum interest limitation,6 9 its
consideration of forum interest factors is potentially far-reaching. If
Keeton is generally applicable, it may require an analysis that differs
from both World-Wide and the broad view of Bauxites. Contrary to
this view of Bauxites, a defendant will still be allowed to set forth a
surrogate jurisdictional objection that does not bear upon his own
personal interest in avoiding distant litigation. Contrary to WorldWide, this non-personal objection will not be grounded in the defendant's state's interest in trying the case in its own courts. Rather, the
objection-whether labelled as a sovereignty objection or something
else-will be grounded in the forum state's lack of interest in trying
the case in its courts.
If lack of forum interest is the only surrogate objection that defendants are allowed after Keeton, however, the effect on plaintiffs will
not be drastic. Plaintiffs normally choose a forum interested in hearing the litigation. 70 Moreover, if the plaintiff is a forum resident, any
surrogate forum interest objection would be easily satisfied, because
the forum state has an obvious interest in allowing a resident to use its
courts and sue conveniently. 7 1 Indeed, the result in World-Wide itself
would be different if a lack of forum interest were defendants' only
available surrogate objection: Oklahoma clearly had an interest in
hearing litigation arising out of an in-state accident, notwithstanding
the defendants' lack of countable contacts in the state.
While the forum interest, or forum disinterest, argument available
to defendants after Keeton is relatively harmless, it is dangerous to
allow defendants any objection that is not derived from a personal
interest in avoiding the burdens of distant litigation. As Justice Brennan stressed in his Keeton concurrence, such a gift to defendants is
improper under a broad view of Bauxites.72 Moreover, the Keeton
analysis may allow the defendant to dredge up other surrogate objec-

inappropriate after Bauxites because the defendant had sufficient contacts with New
Hampshire, and therefore had no personal complaint regarding jurisdiction. Id. at
4349 (Brennan, J., concurring).
69. "We agree that the 'fairness' of haling respondent into a New Hampshire
court depends to some extent on whether.., that state [has] a legitimate interest in
holding respondent answerable ...." Id. at 4347.
70. This is especially true for plaintiffs who forum shop for a favorable choice of
law. If the forum state is interested enough to apply its favorable law, it is certainly
interested enough to hear the case under Keeton.
71. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
72. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4349 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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tions to jurisdiction, such as an objection to a lack of purposeful
contacts even though the defendant is not burdened by distant litigation. Keeton did not deal with this surrogate argument, because the

defendant clearly had purposeful, countable contacts with the fo-

rum. 7 3 Keeton keeps the spirit of World-Wide alive, however, by
allowing defendants to make objections that do not affect their personal interests. It remains to be seen whether World-Wide's specific
surrogate objection retains vitality.
The effect of Bauxites and Keeton on World-Wide must be resolved
before lower courts can approach uniformity in treating minimum
contacts objections by unburdened defendants. 4 Yet clarity and pre-

dictability of result, while necessary, are not sufficient. The Supreme
Court must not solve the sovereignty conflict by a "clear" retreat to
Pennoyer, but by a clear advance in accordance with the realities of
commercial and personal activity. The clarity of the rule adopted is
important, but not as important as the result. 75 If the Court reverts to
World-Wide and requires countable contacts to protect an independent sovereignty interest (or any other interest that can be dreamed
up), some predictability undoubtedly will follow in the era of "King
Pennoyer IV. '' 78 Any added clarity, however, would be obtained at
73. Id. at 4348-49.
74. Lower court decisions after Bauxites unsurprisingly have been varied. Different panels of the Fifth Circuit, for example, have reached contradictory conclusions.
See DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1270-72 (5th Cir. 1983) (Bauxites
replaces sovereignty interest with personal liberty interest; does not require defendant's contacts as a sine qua non); Talbot Tractor Co. v. Hinomoto Tractor Sales,
USA, 703 F.2d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 1983) (no citation to Bauxites; World-Wide's
view of sovereignty limitations and defendant's contacts dispositive); see also Vishay
Intertechnology, Inc. v. Delta Int'l Corp., 696 F.2d 1062, 1068-69 (4th Cir. 1982)
(no citation to Bauxites, but court appears to retreat from sovereignty analysis). It is
unlikely that the Court's ambiguous reference to Bauxites in Keeton will help lower
courts determine the vitality of sovereignty limitations.
75. Cf. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: on Drawing
"Bright Lines" and "Good Faith",43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 307, 325-26 (1982) (bright line
rules should produce results approximating accurate case-by-case application of a
reasonable underlying principle).
76. No one would contend that a defendant's contacts approach could ever result
in unerring predictability of a jurisdictional result. A mere glance at the long-arm
cases catalogued in Professor Casad's book shows that contrary results are reached in
very similar fact situations. Moreover, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
abandon the more broad-ranging "balancing of interests" approach to due process
embodied in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). See Calder
v. Jones, 52 U.S.L.W. 4349, 4351 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984) ("plaintiffs [contacts] ...
may be so manifold as to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their
absence"); World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292 (balancing of interests may be relevant in
appropriate case). As long as McGee retains a semblance of vitality, it is possible for a
lower court to downplay an apparent lack of defendant's contacts and emphasize
plaintiff and forum interests. See Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A.,
638 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tex. 1982) (jurisdiction asserted over foreign cause of action in
"spirit" of McGee), reo'd, 52 U.S.L.W. 4491 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1984).
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the expense of plaintiffs countervailing interest in suing conveniently,
the forum state's interest in protecting the plaintiff, and the need for

judicial efficiency. Most importantly, blind adherence to the defendant's contacts rule will mean that a defendant who suffers no inconvenience by defending in the forum receives a windfall by invoking an
abstract limiting rule-an "unjustified veto power" over plaintiffs
choice of forum. 77 A rule that can be justified only because it is clear is
no better8 than the same rule justified by the legal formalism of sover7
eignty.

In reversing Hall, the Supreme Court focussed exclusively on the insufficiency of
the defendant's contacts with the forum. The Court may thus have adopted the
defendant's contacts approach to fairness once and for all. It is significant, however,
that the Court did not attack the lower Court's McGee-like analysis. Furthermore,
the Court did not discuss whether other interests, such as the interest of the plaintiff
in suing conveniently and the interest of the forum in hearing the case, could
substitute for a lack of defendant's contacts. Such a discussion was unnecessary in
Hall, because Texas' interests in the litigation was minimal, the plaintiffs were nonresidents, and the most convenient forum was probably Peru, where the cause of
action arose. The Texas Court's error, therefore, was in asserting that a McGee-like
balance of interests approach would allow jurisdiction in Texas. The Court in Hall,
therefore, did not necessarily reject the McGee approach for cases in which the
McGee factors are present.
Finally, even assuming that the defendant's contacts/purposeful availment test
becomes a clearly articulated sine qua non, courts will continue to have difficulty
determining which contacts are "countable" against a defendant. See Lakeside
Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain States Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907, 909-11 (1980)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting conflicts among lower courts
as to countability of contacts in interstate contractual transactions); Brilmayer, supra
note 13, at 80-105.
77. See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 312-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1977). The Court in Shaffer
purportedly rejected the presence standard despite the contention that it reached
clear jurisdictional results. It stated that mere clarity of result is not sufficient if the
result does not reflect the balance of interests among the litigants: The cost of clarity
is "too high." Id. at 211.
It has been contended that the Court adopted the defendant's contacts test to
control overreaching by lower courts in effectuating their own state's interests
through a balancing of interests approach. Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds its Reach: A Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 407, 409 (1980) (World-Wide test
"sufficiently clear and workable [so] that the states, despite their contrary selfinterest, would effectively be bound by it or could easily be held to it"). If that was
what the Court intended, there are several problems with the result it reached in
World-Wide:
(1) It is unclear whether substantial control of state court jurisdiction was necessary. See Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of PersonalJurisdiction:A
Reappraisal,59 N.C.L. Rev. 429, 457-59 (1981) (demonstrating the self-restraint of
lower courts in the period between Hanson and Shaffer).
(2) The limiting rule of World-Wide and Shaffer is neither clearly stated nor easily
applicable. See Calder v. Jones, 52 U.S.L.W. 4349, 4351 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984) (first
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In his admirable search for consistency in jurisdictional determinations, Professor Casad does not suggest that predictability be attained
at the cost of practicality or convenience. It can be hoped that Professor Casad's thorough and insightful analysis will spur the courts to
attain predictability by rejecting the formalistic and unnecessarily
limiting requirements of sovereignty and purposeful contacts.
II.

THE CONTINUING EMPHASIS ON PHYSICAL PRESENCE

A. Are Physical Contacts Still Required?
The presence doctrine of Pennoyer is a logical extension of a system
based on the yin/yang of physical power and territorial limitation.
Logic, however, does not guarantee a rational system of forum allocation, especially when the "logic" of presence is built upon formalistic
theories that do not address the modern, practical problems of convenience in litigation.
The problems of adjusting the theoretical presence doctrine to the
real-life, post-Pennoyer world of corporate defendants and interstate
commercial activity have been well-documented. 79 In response to
these problems, International Shoe adopted the minimum contacts
amendment concerns not allowed in jurisdictional analysis because "the infusion of
such considerations would needlessly complicate an already impreciseinquiry") (emphasis added); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1977) (in defendant's
contacts test, "[t]he greys are dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable") (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948)). See supra note 76.
(3) Application of a limiting rule, solely for the purpose of limitation, makes no
sense unless it can be grounded in some constitutionally protectible interest. See
LaFave, supra note 75, at 325-26. Defendant's constitutional interest in avoiding the
burdens of distant litigation, however, is sufficiently protected by a test that requires
purposeful contacts only if defendant is suffering meaningful inconvenience.
(4) The court may have been concerned not only with overreaching assertions of
jurisdiction, but also with overreaching applications of forum law. See Louis, supra,
at 431. But see Keeton, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4348 (statute of limitations is choice of law
question divorced from jurisdictional inquiry). Such concerns, however, can be
addressed in a principled manner only through direct constitutional controls on
choice of law. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 315-17 (1981). Depriving
a forum of an opportunity to hear the case by imposing a strict minimum contacts
test will indeed deprive the forum of an opportunity to apply its law. This indirect
approach to control of forum law, however, has problematic side-effects: Application of the defendant's contacts test will often result in situations in which a court
that has an unexceptionable interest in applying forum law nonetheless will be
unable to hear the case. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213-15 (1977); Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958). This problem of "deprived fora" would not
arise if the Court allowed the forum to assert jurisdiction on a balance of interests
approach. See Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
33, 85-89 (1978).
79. See Hazard, supra note 17, at 272-81. See generally Kurland, The Supreme
Court, the Due Process Clause, and the In PersonamJurisdictionof State Courts, 25
U. Chi. L. Rev. 569 (1958).
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test as an alternative to physical presence. s0 It thus became possible to
argue that a defendant's in-state activity did not necessarily have to be
of the physical, bodily variety to count as a "contact" toward the
"minimum." Long-arm statutes were enacted that provided for jurisdiction even without a physical act in the state by either defendant or
his agents. 8 ' Professor Casad's conclusion that physical presence of the
defendant in the state is no longer an absolute constitutional or statutory requirement 82 is theoretically beyond dispute.
Yet, as Professor Casad indicates throughout his book, reliance on
physical presence has never truly been discarded by the courts. Until
the 1983 term, the Supreme Court had upheld jurisdiction in only two
cases in which there was no physical in-state activity by the defendant
or his agents. 83 The expansive analysis employed by the Court in these
84
two cases had, at the very least, been downplayed in later decisions.
In Shaffer, for example, the Court found that individual directorshareholders of a Delaware corporation did not have sufficient contacts with Delaware. In reaching this conclusion, the Court refused to
consider the obvious non-physical nexus between defendants and the
forum state. 5 Further, the Court supported its holding with the
ominous assertion that the defendants never "set foot" in Delaware.8
Shaffer indicated that while physical activity in the state may not be
absolutely required for a finding of minimum contacts, it certainly
would be a very important factor.
Professor Casad demonstrates that the Supreme Court's apparent
fascination with physical contacts in Shaffer has been shared by the
lower courts. In fraud cases, for example, lower courts regularly
exercise jurisdiction if the defendant makes an oral representation

80. 326 U.S. at 316. "[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Id.
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
81. E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (West 1973); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 2209(a)(2), (4) (Smith-Hurd 1983); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1972).
82. R. Casad, supra note 3, 2.05, at 2-64.
83. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950).
84. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
85. The most notable connection was the acceptance of a directorship in a
Delaware corporation. The Court held, curiously, that this obvious "contact" would
not be countable unless the Delaware Legislature had made it so through enactment
of a consent statute. 433 U.S. at 216. The Delaware Legislature shortly thereafter
enacted such a statute, Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3114 (1982), thereby exalting form
over substance at the direction of the Supreme Court. See Armstrong v. Pomerance,
423 A.2d 174, 175 (Del. 1980).
86. 433 U.S. at 213.
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while physically present in the state.87 In contrast, courts are divided
when the same representation is transmitted into the state by mail,
telephone, or other means."" The traditional importance of physical
presence at least partly accounts for this difference in results.
Physical presence also has been important to the lower courts in
defamation cases. A court has been far more likely to assert jurisdiction if the defendant's physical contacts with the state gave rise to the
defamation.8 9 Similarly, physical presence, especially for negotiation
or execution, frequently has been relied upon by lower courts in
contract cases.9 0 Yet if the same negotiations occur by mail or telephone, the jurisdictional result is far less predictable, even if the
contract is to be substantially performed in the forum state. 1
Professor Casad seeks to explain this Pennoyer-like adherence to the
concept of physical presence by quoting from the oft-cited case of InFlight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc. :92
The presence or absence of the defendant . . . are relevant to

jurisdictional questions-not because of any antiquated idea that
physical presence is. .. imposed by the limits of state sovereignty.
They are relevant because they provide a clue to the significance
attached by the defendant to the activities occurring
within the
93
forum state-and thus as clue to his expectations.
Unfortunately, Professor Casad's penetrating analysis of the long-arm
cases does not bear out the assertion in Van Dusen that physical
presence is only considered relevant in terms of a defendant's "expectations." More typically, a court has required physical presence almost

87. R. Casad, supra note 3, 7.06[1l][a], at 7-55; see Marine Midland Bank, N.A.
v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1981).
88. See R. Casad, supra note 3, 7.0612], [3], at 7-57 to -59. Compare Kramer v.
Vogl, 17 N.Y.2d 27, 32, 215 N.E.2d 159, 162, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904 (1966) (written
misrepresentation sent into forum; jurisdiction denied) with Francis I.duPont & Co.
v. Chelednick, 69 Misc. 2d 362, 330 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1971) (written representation sent
into forum; jurisdiction upheld).
89. CompareBrooks v. Magnaverde Corp., 619 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Okla. Ct. App.
1980) (jurisdiction asserted over defendant who published defamation while physically present in the state) with Tavoulareas v. Comnas, 720 F.2d 192, 194 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (defamation transmitted by interstate telephone call; jurisdiction denied under
District of Columbia long-arm statute because court did not "wish to delve into a
magical mystery tour of 'projecting presences' ").
90. R.Casad, supra note 3, 8.01[2][a][i], at 8-4 to -6; see Mallory Eng'g, Inc. v.
Ted R. Brown & Assocs., Inc., 618 P.2d 1004, 1008-09 (Utah), appeal dismissed, 449
U.S. 1029 (1980).
91. See Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain States Constr. Co., 445 U.S.
907, 909-11 (1980) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Barnstone v.
Congregation Am Echad, 574 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1978).
92. 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972).
93. Id. at 235, quoted in R. Casad, supra note 3, 8.01[2][b], at 8-13.
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for its own sake, as a necessary conceptual basis for jurisdiction. 4 This
is clearly shown in cases in which the court refuses to assert jurisdic-

tion even though the "expectations" 95 of the defendant are evident

through a variety of factors other than physical presence.96
It is of course true that physical contacts are relevant to determining
whether a defendant has subjected himself to jurisdiction under the
current defendant's contacts approach.9 7 It does not follow, however,
that the absence of physical contacts is crucial to the defendant's socalled expectations. When the Court in Pennoyer attached mystical
qualities to physical presence, it could not have envisioned that significant in-state effects could occur by picking up a telephone 1,000 miles
away from the forum state.
The minimum contacts test was designed to cover those modern
developments to which the Pennoyer doctrine was ill-suited.98 Even
under the current strict view of minimum contacts, a telephone contact is just as controllable and purposeful as a contact based upon
actual physical presence; the telephone contact does not result from
the "unilateral activity" of another party.99 Such a contact gives just as
strong a clue to a defendant's "expectations" as does actual physical
presence in the state. Of course, a defendant does not go to as much
trouble in effectuating such a contact; picking up a phone is easier
than getting on an airplane. Yet when the in-state effects are equivalent, and the actions are equally controllable and purposeful, there is

94. See Tavoulareas v. Comnas, 720 F.2d 192, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
95. A jurisdictional system based on defendant's "expectations" is circular and
question-begging. A defendant's expectations are based on what the law of jurisdiction tells him to expect. An absurd result is reached if the law that governs expectations is in turn based on what the defendant is entitled to expect. See World-Wide,
444 U.S. at 311 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court, however,
continues to adhere to the expectations analysis. See Keeton, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4348
(defendant "must reasonably anticipate being haled into court [in the forum]")
(citations omitted); Calder v. Jones, 52 U.S.L.W. 4349, 4351 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984)
(same).
96. See Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d
596, 603-04 (7th Cir. 1979) (contract performed substantially in forum state), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980); Rainbow Indus. Prods. v. Haybuster Mfg., Inc., 419 F.
Supp. 543, 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (numerous negotiations by mail and phone with
plaintiff in forum state; delivery of goods f.o.b. accepted in forum state).
97. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
98. See State ex. rel. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or. 121, 12627, 448 P.2d 571, 573-74 (1968); Kurland, supra note 79, at 573.
99. See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 298. The Court in World-Wide held that in
order for contacts to be countable against the defendant, they must be controllable
by the defendant. This controllability test is designed to allow defendants to adjust
their primary conduct to prevent amenability in forums not of their choice. According to the Court, the contact in World-Wide could not be controlled by the defendants, and thus could not be counted against them. Id. at 297-99.
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no logical or practical basis for distinguishing between a phone call
and an in-state visit. The fact that it is now easier for defendants to
engage in in-state activity should hardly protect them from amenability. Quite the contrary: a modern jurisdictional system must adapt to
advances in communication and technology by providing for amenability upon the use of such advances by defendants. 100 It is inappropriate to give special emphasis to physical contacts and to ignore nonphysical contacts in a modern jurisdictional analysis, whether that
emphasis derives from a restrictive view of "expectations" or from a
simple throwback to the presence mystique of Pennoyer.'0
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Calder v. Jones'0 2 is therefore a welcome sign. The plaintiff in Calder sued the National Enquirer and two individual employees in her home state of California
for a libel distributed extensively in the forum.10 3 The individual
defendants, the writer and editor of the allegedly libelous article,
argued that they had no minimum contacts with California because
they had never
left their desks in Florida while writing and preparing
04
the article.1

100. See Parke-Bernet Galleries v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 17-18, 256 N.E.2d
506, 508-09, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340-41 (1970) (telephone call is sufficient when
effects are equivalent to presence in state). For cases in which courts have not
adapted to technological change, see R. Casad, supra note 3, 4.02[1][a][ii], at 4-22
to -23 & n.76 (discussing cases in which non-physical contacts held insufficient for
jurisdiction).
101. As Professor Casad notes, the long-arm statutes of some states have been held
to require physical in-state activity for some causes of action. See Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc. (Feathers v. McLucas), 15 N.Y.2d 443,
464, 209 N.E.2d 68, 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 24 (tortious act outside state that causes
harm within state not covered by long-arm statute), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905
(1965). The New York State Legislature amended N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 302 after
Feathers to provide for jurisdiction over tortious acts that cause harm within the
state, even without in-state physical activity by the defendant, if other specified
criteria are met. See 1966 N.Y. Laws 725.
To the extent that physical contacts still are required under state law, the legislature, or the court construing the statutory grant, has failed to adapt the state process
to modern commercial activity. This is a disservice to resident plaintiffs forced to sue
in distant states despite defendant's controllable effects in plaintiff's state. This
outmoded result was rejected as a matter of statutory construction by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432, 436-37, 176 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1961). Most state courts construe long-arm
statutes quite expansively. R. Casad, supra note 3, 4.01[1][b], at 4-5.
102. 52 U.S.L.W. 4349 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984).
103. Plaintiff's husband also sued defendants, but filed a voluntary dismissal of his
complaint. Id. at 4350 n.1.
104. It should be noted that acceptance of the defendants' argument in Calder
would allow reporters to avoid in-state amenability for libel claims because they
failed to do physical in-state research: The less diligent the reporter, the less likely it
would be that he could be sued in the state for libel.
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The Court, in a unanimous decision authored by Justice Rehnquist,

went out of its way to uphold jurisdiction despite the absence of
physical in-state contacts. 05 The Court concluded: "An individual
injured in California need not go to Florida to seek redress from

persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the injury in California."

06

The Court in Calder appropriately concluded that physical contacts
were unnecessary when defendants created significant in-state effects
through non-physical contacts. The crucial issue is that the defendants
purposefully created contacts that harmed the defendants in the state.
The fact that the contacts were non-physical is unimportant. Calder
correctly rejects physical presence as an unnecessary conceptual limitation on "effects" jurisdiction.
Calder'sultimate effect upon the Court's consistent fascination with
physical contacts is difficult to assess at this point. There will be many

cases, however, in which the defendant has purposefully created instate effects through non-physical contacts. If, for example, defendant
purposefully calls plaintiff in the forum state to place an order, or to
make a misrepresentation, Calder is clear authority for permitting
jurisdiction. 07 At the very least, Calder should be a signal to lower

courts to give more emphasis to non-physical contacts than they have
in the past.
Beyond Calder, further progress can be made toward abandoning
the mystique of presence by a clear rejection of the sovereignty theory
of due process. While the sovereignty theory does not depend on
physical presence for its continued vitality, the fact is that sovereignty

105. For example, the parties disputed whether the reporter had visited California
to research the article. The Court found it unnecessary to rely on this alleged physical
in-state activity. Id. at 4350 nn.4, 6.
106. Id. at 4351. The Court also held that first amendment concerns are never
relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. The Court reasoned that any potential chilling
effect on activity protected by the first amendment was adequately addressed under
the substantive law of libel. Id. at 4351. On this point the Court rejected the
requirement of "greater contacts" in first amendment cases, established in New York
Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572-73 (5th Cir. 1966).
107. Calder will continue the familiar limitations on jurisdiction based upon
"mere foreseeability" established in World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 295. The Court in
Calder hypothesized a welder who works on a boiler that ultimately explodes in the
forum state. Jurisdiction over the welder is inappropriate because defendant did not
purposefully create an in-state effect through out-of-state conduct. The hypothetical
welder should be distinguished from the buyer or seller who purposefully calls a
party in the forum state in order to do business. See State ex rel. White Lumber Co.
v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or. 121, 126-27, 448 P.2d 571, 573-74 (1968) ("On the strength of
a telephoned offer . . . mills in Oregon were told to fabricate a special order of
plywood ....
It is clear that the placing of the telephoned order had effects, or
'significant contacts,' in Oregon.").
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and presence were entwined in Pennoyer. The repudiation of one
conceptual demon left by Pennoyer undoubtedly would undermine
the companion concept. At least it would cause courts to question the
necessity of physical contacts with more scrutiny than in previous
cases.
B. Are Physical Contacts Still Sufficient?
Any continuing emphasis on physical contacts is problematic because it downplays the relevance of out-of-state activity that purposefully creates an in-state effect. But that is not the only problem.
Adherence to the presence mystique has also led courts to hold that
physical in-state contact is not only necessary, but also sufficient for
assertion of jurisdiction. This unfortunate doctrine has plagued the
courts for over 100 years.
The notion that physical presence in the state will itself support
jurisdiction stems, of course, from Pennoyer.1i 8 While International
Shoe expanded upon Pennoyer's presence analysis, it did not question
the presumed validity of jurisdiction based solely on presence.109
In Shaffer, the Court rejected the notion that the mere presence of
defendant's property in the state was sufficient for assertion of quasi in
rem jurisdiction. Shaffer is inconclusive, however, regarding the general validity of jurisdiction based solely on physical presence in the
state. The property attached by the plaintiff in Shaffer was not physically present in the forum state." 0 Thus, Shaffer's broad attack on the
presence doctrine is dictum and has no direct effect on the assertion of
jurisdiction on the basis of physical presence. The concurring opinions
in Shaffer emphasized that actual physical location of property within
the state could be a sufficient basis of jurisdiction, even quasi in rem
jurisdiction."' The Court did state broadly that "all assertions of
state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards
set forth in InternationalShoe." " 2 This statement, however, is ambiguous, because International Shoe merely supplemented and did not

108. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has never
directly held that physical presence was sufficient in and of itself for jurisdiction. See
Ehrenzweig, supra note 19, at 309-12. The long-standing "rule" of transient jurisdiction ironically is based on dictum in Pennoyer.
109. See Donald Manter Co. v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419, 420 (1st Cir. 1976) (rejecting
argument that transient jurisdiction is prohibited; International Shoe concerned
"with expanding jurisdiction beyond traditional limits, not with contracting it").
110. The properties attached were intangible obligations of a Delaware corporation. A Delaware statute, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 169 (1983), created a fictional instate situs for such intangibles that was at odds with the rules of location adopted by
every other state.
111. 433 U.S. at 217-19 ( Powell & Stevens, JJ., concurring).
112. Id. at 212.
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supplant the emphasis on physical presence in Pennoyer.13 Finally,
when the Court applied the minimum contacts test to the facts in
Shaffer, it stressed that the defendants had no physical contacts with
Delaware.1 1 4 In sum, Shaffer is at best unclear as to whether actual
physical contact with the forum state is sufficient for jurisdictional
purposes.
It is therefore not surprising that plaintiffs continue to argue that
defendant's physical in-state activity is in itself sufficient for jurisdiction. This argument is made in three situations: (1) when there is a
general lack of contact between defendant and the forum state, but
defendant has property physically located in the state which is unrelated to the cause of action (quasi in rem); (2) when the only contact
between defendant and the forum state is his temporary presence
within the borders at the time of service (transient jurisdiction); and
(3) when defendant's only contact with the forum state is through
relatively insignificant physical activity therein, such as the mere
execution of a contract to be performed by both parties in a different
state (minimal physical contacts).
In each of these situations, any rational system of forum allocation
based upon the relative convenience of the litigants and the efficiency
of the judicial system would preclude jurisdiction. In each case, the
defendant's physical contact with the forum state is not determinative
of the issues to be pursued at trial, and is not pertinent to whether the
balance of inconvenience between plaintiff and defendant has been
resolved equitably. Physical contacts, though relevant, cannot fairly
be held sufficient to subject the defendant to jurisdiction. Yet Professor Casad has unearthed lower court decisions upholding jurisdiction
over the defendant in each situation. 11-5 These decisions are not based
on grounds of fairness and convenience in litigation. Rather, they are
symptomatic of the continued obsession with the concept of physical
contacts promulgated by Pennoyer.
113. The Court in InternationalShoe stated that a minimum contacts analysis
would be necessary only if defendant were not present in the forum. 326 U.S. at 316.
114. 433 U.S. at 213.
115. (1) Quasi in rem: Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273, 1278
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
(2) Transient jurisdiction: Aluminal Indus. v. Newtown Commercial Assocs., 89
F.R.D. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 734-35, 273
S.E.2d 22, 24 (1980). Professor Casad suggests that the continued vitality of transient
jurisdiction can be explained on the ground that a resident plaintiff is bringing the
suit. R. Casad, supra note 3, 2.04[2][c], at 2-50. In Aluminal, however, the suit
was brought by a non-resident plaintiff. More importantly, if the minumum contacts
test truly applies to all assertions of state court jurisdiction, transient jurisdiction
should be unconstitutional without regard to the plaintiff's interest. The Supreme
Court has instructed that a threshold of defendant's contacts must always be met.
Mere presence of the defendant cannot satisfy that threshold. See Shafjer, 433 U.S. at
209.
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The Supreme Court's recent decision in Calder did not address the
question whether physical presence in the state is sufficient to support
jurisdiction; the issue in Calderwas the individual defendants' lack of
physical in-state contacts. "6 Calder's de-emphasis of physical contacts
nonetheless may have an effect on a lower court's consideration of
whether physical presence is enough for jurisdiction. If the Supreme
Court has downplayed physical contacts when they do not exist, there
is little reason to give special consideration to physical contacts when
they do exist. It can be hoped that the Court's limited rejection of the
presence mystique in Calderwill lead to the total abandonment of the
conceptual limitation of physical presence.
If our system of forum allocation is to be truly based on fairness and
convenience among the parties, the courts must reject both aspects of
the presence doctrine. It is not fair to plaintiffs to require physical
contacts between the defendant and the state, nor to defendants to
hold that physical contacts are sufficient. Professor Casad's in-depth
investigation of long-arm jurisdiction brings the dual unfairness of the
presence concept sharply into focus.
CONCLUSION

Professor Casad brings some coherence to the disarray of long-arm
adjudication. More importantly, his comprehensive analysis of the
problems in the current state of the law may spur efforts toward
continuing improvement and modernization. These efforts must result
in the rejection of the formalisms of sovereignty and physical presence. In the words of Professor Hazard, it is most important that we
"release Pennoyer's grip on our minds.""17 For anyone who thought
we had already done so,118 I refer you to Professor Casad's book.

(3) Minimal physical contacts: M.L. Byers, Inc. v. HRG Prods., Inc., 492 F. Supp.
827, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (contract negotiations and performance principally outside
forum state; jurisdiction asserted on basis of brief visit by defendant to forum state);
Carlson Corp. v. University of Vt., 380 Mass. 102, 104, 402 N.E.2d 483, 485 (1980)
(physical act of signing contract in forum state was only basis of jurisdiction).
116. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
117. Hazard, supra note 17, at 288.
118. The rash of commentary following Shaffer was generally to the effect that
the Pennoyer concepts were no longer valid. Jay, supra note 78, at 429; see, e.g.,
Nordenberg, supra note 24, at 587, 592; Silberman, supra note 78, 34-36; The
Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 158-59 (1977). After World-Wide,
however, commentators were no longer so certain. See, e.g., Ratner, ProceduralDue
Processand Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: (a) Effective-Litigation Values vs. The TerritorialImperative; (b) the Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct, 75 Nw. U.L. Rev.
363, 368-74 (1980); Ripple & Murphy, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson:
Reflections on the Road Ahead, 56 Notre Dame Law. 65, 74 (1980); The Supreme
Court, 1979 Term, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 75, 116 (1980).

